Technology-supported Risk Estimation by Predictive Assessment of Socio-technical Security

Deliverable D2.4.1

TRE$_S$PASS information system
Members of the TRE$_{S}$PASS Consortium

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Management Summary

This document describes the prototype TRE$_5$PASS information system that supports the TRE$_5$PASS process and tools in modeling risk across complex social-technical environments. These tools and process require an information repository and management framework that allows complex scenarios to be iteratively analysed in such a way that the intermediate and final results are auditable. Put another way, the TRE$_5$PASS information system provides the glue between the Attack Navigator Map (ANM) tool, the data, model and analytics tools. The task of developing an information system that provides the different TRE$_5$PASS tools with the combination of data that they require is complex. During the early project periods it was planned that the information system be based on traditional relational data schemes implemented in database technology. It became apparent that this approach had a number of drawbacks, in particular the use of static structures in heterogeneous scenarios, the lack of built-in versioning for model iterations and finally the lack of simple techniques to add programmable logic.

The final strategy was to use a 100% text based approach. For example JSON and XML are used for data persistence, a source code repository tool is used for versioning and the simplification of data exchange and finally the use of the text based Python scripting language for combining data with programmable logic. The latter allows practitioners to persist their SME knowledge.

Key takeaways:

- The TRE$_5$PASS information system is a storage platform for data gathered through the tools and approaches developed in WP2
- The system provides a set of APIs for interfacing and supporting configuration through the Attack Map Navigator.
- The system provides a set of APIs for supporting the extension and decoration of TRE$_5$PASS models and constructs.
- A method is presented that allows domain specific knowledge to be captured and combined with data in programmable logic.
- The system provides a set of APIs for supplying global, domain and instance data to analytics tools.
- Finally, the system uses a distributed code repository technology for simplifying the versioning and the sharing of data.
1. Introduction

1.1. Goals

The focus of this deliverable is to address the topic of creating an information system used to store the social and technical data gathered during a TREşPASS risk analysis and provide interfaces between the TREşPASS tools and components that require different perspectives at different parts of the TREşPASS process. Requirements for the information system are defined in The TREşPASS Project, D2.1.1 (2013).

1.2. Choices made

We chose to use a source code versioning system for the base management platform and not a database platform. This gave us:

- a simple way to versioning model iterations
- a simplified way to share and merge data and logic patterns
- built-in access control features
- built-in automation features.

We chose to move all data and logic to text based solutions for compatibility with source code versioning systems.

We chose the Python scripting language for the text based addition of programmable logic and because it is widely known. This is used for the attack pattern augmentation and annotation logic used by the Attack Pattern Library (APL).

We chose to provide all functionality through RESTful APIs rather than database interfaces.

We provide support for three different categories of data like generic, domain specific and instance specific.

We chose to clearly differentiate between source data and derived or generated data.

We used the RDF data format for persisting social and technical background knowledge.

1.3. Foreground and background

The TREşPASS Information System is completely in foreground IP with the exception of:
1.4. Document structure

Chapter 2 gives an overview of the TRE$_3$PASS Information System, while Chapter 3 gives details by an examplary walkthrough through the system and the related resources. Chapter 4 describes how the TRE$_3$PASS Information System was evolved and validated. An alternative approach to handling data related to socio-technical cyber risk is discussed in Chapter 5. We close with conclusions in Chapter 6.

Furthermore, Appendix A explains how to gain access to the prototype, Appendix B gives details of the API to the TRE$_3$PASS Information System with example calls and responses for reference.

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1CherryPy http://cherrypy.org
2RDFLib https://github.com/RDFLib/rdflib
3Dulwich https://www.dulwich.io
2. The TREsPASS Information System

This chapter describes the TREsPASS Information System that enables the storage of the data relevant for a specific TREsPASS modeling instance into one common data space.

2.1. Overview

The TREsPASS process consists of many different steps and tools as shown and explained in The TREsPASS Project, D5.4.2 (2016).

For a specific instance of this process, i.e., a specific instance of a scenario or use case, it is advisable to keep all involved source, intermediate and result data in a common repository for grouping and managing its life cycle, also in order to support traceability throughout the process.

As the data and evaluations essentially are iterative, as they profit from progressive modelling and refinement, input and result data will exist in different iterations during the life cycle of a risk analysis in the TREsPASS process. Ideally, these iterations should still be comprehensible (and possibly auditable) in hindsight.

A similar problem exists in software engineering where versioning systems support developers in keeping the history (and attribution) of pieces of code. Using a version control system therefore seems to be very suited also to use in the TREsPASS process.

Using a standard version control system also means that information ideally should be in text form, like source code, as this allows, at least in principle, easy comprehension by humans, efficient storage of different versions as well as powerful highlighting of changes between versions.

2.2. Implementation

Base inputs to the working of the TREsPASS Information System include the socio-technical background data, but can also include specific technical data like model excerpts generated automatically (as e.g., described in The TREsPASS Project, D2.2.2 (2015) for the cloud use case).

Fig. 2.1 gives a summary and overview of the Information System, its content and interactions with the TREsPASS tools.
2.2. Implementation

In multiple source files, shown in blue in the figure, the background knowledge is captured and made available through the TRE$_5$PASS Information System’s http-based interface to the various tools (for details of the API calls see Appendix B):

**Types (RDF N3)** Social and technical background knowledge is captured in the form of RDF (W3C, 2004) statements. This is used as base stating the available types during the model building with the Attack Navigator Map (ANM) (‘types’ call) as well as for background queries by Treemaker (‘getData’ calls). This background knowledge can be combined from different files, i.e., for generic data and domain specific data.

**Treebank Attack Patterns & Annotation Logic (Python)** Data for the augmentation of generated attack trees as well as the logic to annotate specific attack steps is stored in the form of Python patterns and code. These files contain functions for augmentation and annotation that will be used by the Attack Pattern Library (APL) calls (‘getAnnotations’ call). More background for the APL can be found in The TRE$_5$PASS Project, D5.3.2 (2015). These functions can be combined from multiple source files so the corresponding knowledge can be differentiated into generic and domain specific parts.

**Attacker Profiles (XML)** The various available attacker profiles are captured in XML form in this source file. These can be used for selection in the ANM as well as for analysis.
in the Attack Tree Analyzer (ATA). ANM also has the possibility to create and store new attack profiles through the ‘attackerprofile’ call.

**ATA GA Parameters (JSON)** Source for various collections of parameters for the genetic algorithm part of the Attack Tree Analyzer (ATA), accessible via the ‘ataGaParameter’ call to the TRE\textsubscript{PASS} Information System.

**Model Patterns (JSON)** During the creation of models, patterns of components might be helpful as higher-level building blocks for models. Through ‘modelPattern’ call to the TRE\textsubscript{PASS} Information System these patterns can be queried and stored.

These files are described in more detail in Section 3.2.

A typical process flow will involve the TRE\textsubscript{PASS} Information System and create intermediate and result files (shown in green in Fig. 2.1) in the following way:

1. The Attack Navigator Map is used to create a model system: during the initialisation of a model the Attack Navigator Map (ANM) will interact with the TRE\textsubscript{PASS} Information System to first establish a new model context defined by a unique modelID (‘model’ call). At that time, generic and domain-specific source files will be copied into a model-specific container (=directory with version control) to keep all data for a specific model instance together as context. The ANM can use the defined types (‘types’ call), model patterns (‘modelPattern’ call) and attacker profiles (‘attackerProfile’ calls).

The TRE\textsubscript{PASS} Information System also serves as a persistence container for the browser-based ANM frontend UI (‘model’ call, stored in a Model persistence JSON file). Toolchains can be selected and started via the ‘toolchain’ call, status and result (or error information) will be available through the corresponding ‘task’ call.

The ANM will export the created model scenario into the TRE\textsubscript{PASS} Model File and TRE\textsubscript{PASS} Scenario File as required for input to Treemaker.

2. Treemaker reads model and scenario files and creates an attack tree for the given scenario. To get more information for specific model components, Treemaker can use the ‘getData’ call to the TRE\textsubscript{PASS} Information System, e.g. to understand whether a specific component is a physical component (i.e., persistent, so could be stolen by carrying away the component) or a virtual component (i.e., non-persistent and therefore could be stolen by cloning). The result of running Treemaker is the Attack Tree file.

3. This attack tree is augmented and annotated by the APL, using the ‘getAnnotations’ call to the TRE\textsubscript{PASS} Information System, creating as a result an augmented and annotated version of the attack tree (‘Attack Tree augmented & annotated’).

4. Subsequent analysis tools like the Attack Tree Analyzer (ATA) and Attack Tree Evaluator (ATE) use this augmented and annotated attack tree and analyse it for the most important potential attack vectors, storing their results again in (XML or plain) text files.

5. The ANM then reads these and visualises the results of the analysis.
6. The security professional using the system can then decide whether the current results are satisfactory or whether to refine the model or change parameters for a new analysis cycle.

All of the relevant information is kept in the form of text files, to allow simple capture, versioning and sharing. The versioning specifically allows to keep track of all developments and changes of the model instance, allowing to trace results back to the source data used at the time.

The version control system *git*[^1] is chosen as it is distributed and therefore does not require a central server while still allowing sharing and cloning via a central git repository if desired (e.g., with a gitlab[^2] server). Such a master directory easily supports sharing and dissemination while supporting sensitive information through strong access control functionality. It is also available for free on all platforms and well-established in the developer community.

### 2.3. Summary

The TREsPASS information system serves as a container repository gathering all input and output data for a specific TREsPASS modelling instance, making it available to the required tools in the modelling and analysis process through http-based API calls, while keeping track of the version history of source and generated data.

This allows to keep the data for a modelling instance in a central place together with its dependency chain and history, allowing managing, branching and roll-back while providing traceability and auditability during the unfolding TREsPASS process.

[^1]: Git distributed version control system [https://git-scm.com](https://git-scm.com)
[^2]: GitLab [https://gitlab.com](https://gitlab.com)
3. Walkthrough using the TREsPASS Information System by example

This chapter describes the functionality of the TREsPASS Information System (TIS) using an example model of the ATM use case. For more details about the background to this use case, see The TREsPASS Project, D7.4.2 (2016).

As the TIS is a backend system that is tied to the Attack Navigator Map (ANM) as a frontend for the risk analysis in TREsPASS, we use the ANM as the context to describe the functionality. For the detailed information about the ANM itself, we refer to the manual that is available online following the 'manual' link after loading the ANM (see Fig. 3.2 lower left) or directly at https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Qp8nJgdevDespq1Q5zQcAT1SSTKK23m2XKMUKKmoKYQU/edit.

ANM and TIS are accessible online at https://trespass.itrust.lu/attack-navigator-map/index.html (for details about access and login see Appendix A).

The walkthrough consists of:

- Initial setup of the demonstration model system
- Discussion of the configuration files that support the creation of the model scenario
- Discussion of the files generated during the risk analysis with the TREsPASS tools.

3.1. Initial setup of the demonstration model system

Please follow these steps to prepare the demonstration scenario in the ANM

1. Download the ATM demo model from https://trespass.itrust.lu/tkb/tkb/ATM_Demo_Model
3. You will find the ANM with an empty model like shown in Fig. 3.1
4. Use the button 'Create new map' on the right hand side of the ANM
5. Enter a new map title of your choice
6. Use the button 'Import model file' on the right hand side of the ANM
7. Select the just-downloaded file 'atm-model-file.xml'
8. If you are asked
   'A model with this id exists already: id-SJfWe72p-model Do you want to
   overwrite the existing one?'
   press 'Cancel', then for the following
   'Would you still like to load the file, but use a new id instead?'
   press 'OK'

9. ANM loads the model file and instantiates this model - see Fig. 3.2

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Figure 3.1.: View of the ANM after initial access - yet no model loaded.
3.1. Initial setup of the demonstration model system

Figure 3.2.: View of the ANM after loading the ATM demonstration model.
3.2. Discussion of the configuration files

The configuration files for the configuration of the TRE\textsuperscript{S}PASS risk analysis tool are accessible easiest by clicking on ‘Debug options’ in the top right of the ANM (see Fig. 3.2), then clicking on ‘edit knowledgebase files’.

3.2.1. Defining the base files - config_source_file.ini

This file, as shown in Fig. 3.3, defines for the information system the list of additional configuration files used.

All sections will be described in more detail in the following sections 3.2.2–3.2.7 (with exception of the toolchains.json that is used only internally for the definition of the toolchains that are exposed in the ANM).

Two sections allow the definition of multiple files, namely the annotations and the data_types sections as for these it seems especially appropriate to allow splitting the information into different domains.

![Figure 3.3: View of the default config_source_file.ini file.](image)
3.2.2. Defining used types, extend with additional data - types_parameters.n3

The part shown in Fig. 3.4 represents the type definition of a door. The file is semantically structured as RDF (W3C, 2004) information in N3 (W3C, 2011) notation.

The type tkb:door herein is marked to be a tkb:type - all such elements will be represented by the ANM for selection of new map elements. This definition also contains a set of attributes (marked through the tkb_has_attribute predicate) that the ANM is presenting to fill or select, like here the ‘Name’ and the ‘Burglar Resistance Class’. Every such attribute then has a set of possible values.

This can be seen in the screenshot of the ANM in Fig. 3.5.

Additional types can be defined in this file and will be available in the ANM after using the button ‘re-fetch knowledgebase data’ in the ‘Debug options’ of the ANM.

This file also serves as container for additional type-related properties that can be defined for use in Treemaker and/or the APL logic.

![Figure 3.4: View of the default types_parameters.n3 file.](image-url)
3.2. Discussion of the configuration files

Figure 3.5.: Corresponding ANM representation to the type door as defined in the default types_parameters.n3 file.
3.2.3. Capture of pre-made model patterns - model_patterns.json

Fig. 3.6 shows the default for the model_patterns.json file. This file captures ready made patterns that can be used inside the ANM as building blocks. It is best edited by saving existing maps as model patterns (per context menu of the ANM) rather than direct editing of this file.

Figure 3.6.: View of the default model_patterns.json file.

3.2.4. The central model file - model.xml

This file represents the full information about the current state of the model system. It contains the model components in the main XML structure that is in turn used by the following analysis by Treemaker, but also contains the UI-state of the ANM to allow an easy sharing of a model.

It is usually not advisable to edit this file directly, rather to use the ANM to create the file in the correct syntax and semantic.
3.2.5. Defining the logic of augmentations and annotations - apl_logic.py

The APL part of the analysis consists of two steps:

- augmentation: after Treemaker creates the initial attack tree for the model, it is possible to extend this generated tree by refining the contents of the leaf labels, e.g., for domain-specific attack definitions.

- annotation: after the augmentation step, during the annotation values like probability of attack, required time and budget etc are attached to all leaf nodes as required for the subsequent analysis tools.

As these are very open steps, which cannot be predefined in generality and then merely configured, to allow for the required flexibility it was decided that these steps would be driven by modular programs with one of the easier to use scripting language. Due to its broad availability, large user-base and support Python was chosen for this task.

This is one of the cases where a potential domain-modularity is useful, therefore multiple APL logic scripts can be used — as to be configured in the config_sources_file.ini (see Sec. 3.2.1). During the call to the APL by the backend, the scripts configured here will be called in sequence for all leaf nodes of the generated attack tree, once for augmentation and once for annotation.

A snippet for one of the demo scripts can be seen in Fig. 3.7. An array of augmentator functions is defined here (and can be extended), here a simple default_augmentator. All functions defined here would be called in turn for every leaf node of the generated attack tree until the first one matches, i.e., returns a non-None result. Here the default_augmentator is defined to look through an array of potentially matching leaf-label patterns, then returning a corresponding augmented XML snippet that would replace the given leaf node.

Similarly, Fig. 3.8 shows an example for annotation handling by the APL script. Here two annotator functions are defined, one handling a class of 'MAKE ...' attack leaves representing social engineering steps, one handling the default case when no more specific pattern has been found, thereby setting the default annotations (as annotations are required for the use of the later analysis tools).

In cases where no fitting annotation for a certain attack tree leaf-label is found, the APL will return an error stating all leaf-labels, for which no annotator is found. As an example, see the error messages shown during the tools run in Fig. 3.9, when the default_annotator is removed from the annotator_functions in Fig. 3.8, i.e., when using

    annotator_functions = [make_in_annotator]

instead in apl_logic.py. In case of such errors, the APL script(s) need to be extended to also cover the leaf-labels shown in the error message.

A more complex example how to use available vulnerability data in APL decisions during annotation can be found as part of the default apl_logic_cloud.py.
3.2. Discussion of the configuration files

Figure 3.7.: Snippet of the default apl_logic_cloud.py file as example for augmentation handling.

Figure 3.8.: Snippet of the default apl_logic.py file as example for annotation handling.
3.2. Discussion of the configuration files

Figure 3.9.: When no fitting annotation can be found for certain attack tree leaf-labels, error messages for these labels will be shown when the APL is run as part of the toolchain.
3.2.6. Defining attacker profiles - attacker_profiles.xml

The current set of defined attacker profiles follows Intel’s threat agent risk assessment classification (Rosenquist, 2009), but can be extended either via this file or the ANM UI (see Fig. 3.11).

![Image of attacker_profiles.xml file]

Figure 3.10.: View of the default attacker_profiles.xml file.
Figure 3.11.: The ANM allows to modify the attacker profiles in its UI.
3.2.7. Additional parameter sets for running the ATA analysis tools - ata_algorithm_parameters.json

This file, as shown in Fig. 3.12, specifies sets of parameters especially required by the run of the Attack Tree Analyser (ATA) analysis tool by partner Cybernetica (CYB).

![View of the default ata_algorithm_parameters.xml file.](image)

Figure 3.12.: View of the default ata_algorithm_parameters.xml file.
3.3. Discussion of the generated files

A run of the different tools can be started in the ‘Run analysis’ section of the ANM (see Fig. 3.13). The resulting analysis results will be shown like in Fig. 3.14.

During these toolruns a set of new intermediate and result files are generated, as can be seen in Fig. 3.15 (and the overview in Fig. 2.1):

1. TREsPASS Model & Scenario file: before the toolrun start the model as captured in ANM is translated to the required input files for Treemaker, namely model.xml and scenario.xml.
2. Attack tree generated by Treemaker as file treemaker_output_combined.xml
3. Attack tree generated by augmentation and annotation by the APL, as shown in Fig. 3.15 (apl_output.txt)
4. Analysis results from Attack Tree Analyser ATA (ata_output.zip) and Attack Tree Evaluator ATE (ate_output.txt)

All of these files are part of the model directory, which is kept under version control in the TIS.

Figure 3.13.: ‘Run analysis’ section of the ANM.
Figure 3.14.: Analysis results as seen in the ANM.

The complete directory including versioning information can be downloaded via the button 'Download model directory' (see Fig. 3.15). As this directory is a normal git repository, all git tools are available to access the version info, like the git command line tools, the free SourceTree¹ (as shown in Fig. 3.16) or the free GitHub Desktop².

¹SourceTree https://www.sourcetreeapp.com/
²GitHub Desktop https://desktop.github.com
3.3. Discussion of the generated files

Figure 3.15.: View of the model files after an analysis run. Content of the generated `apl_output.xml` file.
3.3. Discussion of the generated files

Figure 3.16: After downloading the model directory, all files are available locally including its version history. This is a normal git repository, so all normal git tools are able to show the history of changes - here through the free application SourceTree.
4. Evolution and validation

The TRE$_5$PASS Information System was created and evolved together with the tools using it, namely the Attack Navigator Map (ANM) as the user interface supporting the creation of new models for the risk analysis, Treemaker for automatically creating attack trees from the model, the Attack Pattern Library (APL), as well as further analysis tools like the Attack Tree Analyser (ATA) and Attack Tree Evaluator (ATE).

Being in step with the development of the tools ensured its suitability to fulfil the requirements driven by the tools and the overall TRE$_5$PASS process. This happened through direct interaction with the tool owners on the one hand, and through the issue tracker shared with ANM for handling findings by the general user/tester community.

The TRE$_5$PASS Information System is available online as the backend accessed by the ANM at https://trespass.itrust.lu/attack-navigator-map/index.html.
5. Alternative approach: Agent-based modelling

In addition to the TRE5PASS information system outlined in the previous chapters, the project has studied alternative ways of handling data related to socio-technical cyber risk. One of these is agent-based modelling and simulation described in this chapter.

Within the TRE5PASS model, actors play a key role. These are both attackers and defenders, who either make decisions based on information available to them (the best possible attack), or act probabilistically (the probability that a defender falls for a social engineering attempt). As such, the actors in the TRE5PASS model have many features in common with the agents in what is called agent-based modelling. In the final stages of the project, an attempt has been made to investigate the suitability of agent-based modelling for analysing socio-technical cyber risk. Although agent-based modelling has been used in a wide variety of application domains, the use in cyber security and associated risk is innovative compared to the state of the art.

Agent-based modelling is characterised by the simulation of interactions between different agents, whose behaviour can be subject to decision-making rules as well as randomness. Agents can observe parts of the environment, and use this to make decisions that contribute to their goals (utility). In this sense, agent-based modelling is related to game theory, but (a) it starts from actual rather than optimal behaviour, (b) it may involve a larger number of agents, and (c) it solves the problem by a large number of simulation runs rather than analytically.

Security risk can be modelled in such an approach by enabling agents to execute actions that may harm other stakeholders. It can then be investigated under what conditions the number of such actions (attacks) and/or their impact becomes higher or lower. Obvious candidate agents in the cyber security space include attackers and defenders. However, one may also consider legislators, vulnerability discoverers, etc.

Two master's thesis projects at TU Delft, supervised by Wolter Pieters, have designed agent-based models for specific aspects of cyber risk. In the first (Slangen, 2016), it was investigated which aspects of the behaviour of attackers and defenders influence the cyber risk incurred by a defender, in terms of the number of attacks against this defender. In particular, the effect of the control strength deployed by the defenders and their investment strategy were studied. The following 5 key insights were derived (quoted):

1. When fewer defenders decide to heavily invest in cyber-security, the group of defenders with a low control strength incurs many successful cyber-attacks. When more defenders decide to heavily invest in cyber-security, the number of successful
5. Alternative approach: Agent-based modelling

D2.4.1 v1.0

cyber-attacks incurred by defenders with a high control strength more or less stays the same.

2. When more threat agents become more skilful and resourceful, this will increase the number of successful cyber-attacks incurred by a defender organisation with a relatively high control strength, not the number of successful cyber-attacks of a defender organisation with a low control strength.

3. When defender organisations follow a reactive strategy with very high investment for a longer period, a defender organisation that invests quite a lot in cyber-security by default, is likely to incur more successful cyber-attacks.

4. Longer spells of a reactive strategy are more effective than short spells of a reactive strategy with respect to lowering the number of successful cyber-attacks incurred by a defender.

5. When threat agents become less rational, the number of successful cyber-attacks incurred by a weakly protected defender decreases whereas the successful cyber-attack incurred by a well protected defender increases.

In the second (Breukers, 2016), the vulnerability discovery rate and number of attacks on certain software and its users (defenders) were investigated. The agent-based model included behavioural characteristics of software vendors, vulnerability discoverers, attackers and defenders. One of the key results is that when vendors have long patch development times, but also release patches continuously, this significantly increases the number of attacks on their software. At the same time, users of the software can reduce their risk by deploying the patches quickly in their organisation. Both master's theses are judged to be publishable as scientific papers.

Compared to the TREsPASS Information System, agent-based modelling has a different approach to data. The data representation in agent-based models takes the form of:

- Inputs, represented by behavioural rules of the agents
- Outputs, represented by the distribution of the variables of interest (such as number of attack) over the runs in the simulation.

Agent-based models can be used to test whether assumed behavioural rules make sense compared to a reality of observed outputs (when such data is available). Conversely, when data on real-world attacks is scarce, simulated data can be generated from reasonable assumptions on the expected behaviour of the agents.

Compared to the TREsPASS information system, the current results on agent-based modelling exhibit (a) a more advanced representation of the agents in the system and their behaviour, but (b) a more abstract representation of the systems and attacker under consideration. We expect that the integration of agent-based simulations with the fine-grained system representations (maps) of TREsPASS is a fruitful area for further research. In such an approach, attackers would make decisions for each attack step rather than for a rather abstract attack as a whole, enabling more detailed analyses of the contribution of controls to the reduction of cyber risk. Agent-based modelling would also enable the TREsPASS models to work with populations of attackers and defenders.
6. Conclusions

With the TRE5PASS Information System we have created an approach that fulfils the requirements of the TRE5PASS process and tools, namely the need of a backend containing all required configuration files for the risk analysis, as well as responding to requests by ANM, Treemaker and APL calls.

The deliberate choice to move from a database approach to a system based on configuration by text-based files makes the system extendable and allows data to be shared in a simple manner between different practitioners. Using Python as a generic language for integration allows practitioner SME input to be used in arbitrary complexities with programmable logic.
References


The TREsPASS Project, D2.1.1. (2013). *Initial requirements for the data management process*. (Deliverable D2.1.1)

The TREsPASS Project, D2.2.2. (2015). *Data extraction from virtualized infrastructures*. (Deliverable D2.2.2)

The TREsPASS Project, D5.3.2. (2015). *Best practices for model creation and sharing*. (Deliverable D5.3.2)

The TREsPASS Project, D5.4.2. (2016). *The integrated TREsPASS process*. (Deliverable D5.4.2)

The TREsPASS Project, D7.4.2. (2016). *Final report case study c*. (Deliverable D7.4.2)


A. How to access the prototype

To access the prototype described in this deliverable, a one-time registration is required:

2. Click on Sign-up, you will receive a confirmation email, you need to click on it to acknowledge the registration. The itrust ICT administrator will have to personally validate your account.
3. Once you receive the validation email, you will be able to access the Attack Navigator Map at https://trespass.itrust.lu/attack-navigator-map/index.html (and other tools).
B. API Overview and Examples TRESPASS Information System

This appendix describes the API of the TRESPASS Information System with examples. The most recent version of the API description can be found online at https://trespass.itrust.lu/tkb/tkb.

B.1. Annotations

• POST adtree as XML, receive augmented and annotated adtree as XML, in context of model with model_id:

```
curl -i -X "POST" "http://localhost:8080/tkb/getAnnotations?model_id=default_model" \
-H "Content-Type: application/xml" -H "Accept: application/xml" -d '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<adtree>
  <node refinement="disjunctive">
    <label> IN terry DATA fileX fileX ITEM entity_vim.VirtualMachine_vm-51 entity_vim.VirtualMachine_vm-51</label>
  </node>
</adtree>
```

results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2016 14:37:45 GMT
Content-Type: application/xml
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Content-Length: 2812
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<adtree xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://research.cyber.ee/~antonc/adtree.xsd" profit="1000000" id="default_model" idsonly="true">
  <node refinement="disjunctive">
    <label>IN terry DATA fileX fileX ITEM entity_vim.VirtualMachine_vm-51 entity_vim.VirtualMachine_vm-51</label>
  </node>
</adtree>
```

• POST adtree as XML, containing leaves for which no annotations are available, receive list of labels with missing annotations as XML, in context of model with model_id:
B.2. Attackerprofiles

• GET full list of attacker profiles in context of model with model_id (as json)


results in:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2016 17:10:37 GMT
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Content-Length: 2552
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept

[
  {
    "id": "AP0001",
    "description": "Current highly qualified employee with harmless intent. Theft of IP, PII, or business data.",
    "budget": "10000",
    "codename": "Employee Trained",
    "time": "D",
    "skill": "H"
  },
  ...
]

• GET full list of attacker profiles in context of model with model_id (as xml)

results in:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 14:56:36 GMT
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Length: 2182
Content-Type: application/xml
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Access-Control-Allow-Origin:

<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<profiles>

<profile budget="10000" skill="H" codename="Employee Trained" id="AP0001" time="D" description="Current highly qualified employee with harmless intent. Theft of IP, PII, or business data."

...</profiles>

• GET specific attacker profile in context of model with model_id (as json)

curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/attackerprofile/AP0007?model_id=default_model" \
-H "Accept: application/json"

results in:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin:
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2016 17:06:54 GMT
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Content-Length: 234
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept

{
  "id": "AP0007",
  "description": "Organized crime organization with significant resources. Theft of IP, PII, or business data; violence."
  "budget": "60000",
  "codename": "Organized Crime Group",
  "time": "D",
  "skill": "H"
}

• GET specific attacker profile in context of model with model_id (as xml)

curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/attackerprofile/AP0007?model_id=default_model" \
-H "Accept: application/xml"

results in:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin:
Content-Type: application/xml
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 14:55:42 GMT
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Content-Length: 245
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept

<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<profile budget="60000" skill="H" codename="Organized Crime Group" id="AP0007" time="D" description="Organized crime organization with significant resources. Theft of IP, PII, or business data; violence."

• PUT: create new attacker profile in context of model with model_id

curl -i -X PUT -H "Content-Type:application/json" "http://localhost:8080/tkb/attackerprofile/AP_test?model_id=default_model" \
-d '{"budget": "5000", "codename": "Test AP", "time": "D", "id": "AP_test", "description": "Test Attacker Profile"}'

results in:
B.3. ATA_GA_Parameters

• DELETE specific attacker profile in context of model with model_id

```bash
curl -i -X DELETE -H "Content-Type:application/json" \
"http://localhost:8080/tkb/attackerprofile/AP_test?model_id=default_model"
```

results in:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
Content-Length: 0
Date: Wed, 09 Mar 2016 16:25:03 GMT
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Type: application/json
```

B.3. ATA_GA_Parameters

• GET full list of ATA GA Parameter sets in context of model with model_id

```bash
```

results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 406
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2016 11:53:24 GMT
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Type: application/json

{
   "ap_config_FF": "#Genetics algorithm parameters.
   #Mon Jun 01 09:51:22 EEST 2015
   pplNr=200
   precision=1
   crossType=UNIFORM
   utility=FF
   mutationFactor=0
   timeMS=3600000
   genNum=200
   genBudget=1000",
   "ap_config_PM": "#Genetics algorithm parameters.
   #Mon Jun 01 09:51:22 EEST 2015
   pplNr=200
   precision=1
   crossType=UNIFORM
   utility=PM
   mutationFactor=0
   timeMS=3600000
   genNum=200
   genBudget=1000"
}
```

• GET specific set of ATA GA Parameter in context of model with model_id

```bash
```

results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 171
```
B.4. Types

- GET full list of types in context of model with model_id (as json)

```bash
```

results in:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Content-Length: 7356
Content-Type: application/json
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2016 17:22:08 GMT

[
  {
    "tkb:forceability": true,
    "tkb:persistence": true,
    "tkb:cloneability": false,
    "@label": "Actor",
    "skos:broader": {
      "tkb:forceability": true,
      "tkb:cloneability": false,
      "@label": "Human Being",
      "tkb:persistence": true,
      "@id": "tkb:human",
      "tkb:soc_eng_probability": 50,
      "@type": "tkb:generalised_type"
    },
    ...,
  }
]
```

- GET specific type in context of model with model_id (as json)

```bash
```

---

# Genetics algorithm parameters.
# Mon Jun 01 09:51:22 EEST 2015

- `pplNr=200`
- `precision=1`
- `crossType=UNIFORM`
- `utility=FF`
- `mutationFactor=0`
- `timeMS=3600000`
- `genNum=200`
- `genBudget=1000`
results in:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Content-Length: 1677
Content-Type: application/json
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2016 17:23:49 GMT

{
  "tkb:forceability": true,
  "tkb:persistence": true,
  "tkb:cloneability": false,
  "@label": "Actor",
  "skos:broader": {
    "tkb:forceability": true,
    "tkb:cloneability": false,
    "@label": "Human Being",
    "tkb:persistence": true,
    "@id": "tkb:human",
    "tkb:soc_eng_probability": 50,
    "@type": "tkb:generalised_type"
  },
  "tkb:tml_class": "actor",
  "@id": "tkb:actor",
  "tkb:has_attribute": [
    {"@type": "tkb:attribute",
     "@label": "Name",
     "@id": "tkb:actor_name",
     "tkb:values": ["nuc2"]
    }
  ],
  "@type": "tkb:type"
}

B.5. Data

- GET with id as string in context of model with model_id, receive data as json (default w/o Accept header)


results in

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 11:56:30 GMT
Content-Length: 134
Content-Type: application/json
Server: CherryPy/3.8.0

{
  "forceability": "false",
  "label": "nuc2",
  "type": "HostSystem",
  "persistence": "persistent",
  "soc_eng_probability": 50
}
B.6. Model

- GET with id as string in context of model with model_id, receive data as xml

```bash
curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/getData?model_id=default_model&id=entity_vim.HostSystem_host-19" \
-H "Accept: application/xml"
```

results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 11:56:57 GMT
Content-Length: 200
Content-Type: application/xml
Server: CherryPy/3.8.0

<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<node>
  <forceability>false</forceability>
  <label>nuc2</label>
  <type>HostSystem</type>
  <persistence>persistent</persistence>
  <cloneability>false</cloneability>
</node>
```

- Create a new model with id ‘new_model’

```bash
curl -i -X PUT -H "Content-Length:0" "http://localhost:8080/tkb/model/new_model"
```

results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 0
Server: CherryPy/3.8.0
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 22:33:40 GMT
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Type: application/json
```

- Query model with id ‘new_model’

```bash
curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/model/new_model"
```

results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 2
Server: CherryPy/3.8.0
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 22:35:35 GMT
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Type: application/json

{}()
```

- List models

```bash
curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/model"
```
results in

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 17
Server: CherryPy/3.8.0
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 22:36:16 GMT
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Type: application/json

[
    "new_model"
]

• Create item in model

    curl -i -X PUT -H "Content-Type:application/json" "http://localhost:8080/tkb/model/new_model/door1" \
    -d '{"id":"door1", "class":"class1"}'

results in

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 0
Server: CherryPy/3.8.0
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 22:42:47 GMT
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Type: application/json

• Query item

    curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/model/new_model/door1"

results in

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 41
Server: CherryPy/3.8.0
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 22:43:58 GMT
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "id": "door1",
    "class": "class1"
}

• Rename item

    curl -i -X POST -H "Content-Length:0" "http://localhost:8080/tkb/model/default_model/door1?rename_to=renamed_door1"

results in

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Server: CherryPy/6.0.1
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2016 21:23:13 GMT
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Content-Length: 40
B.7. Schemas

- **Delete item**

  ```
  curl -i -X DELETE "http://localhost:8080/tkb/model/new_model/door1"
  ```

  results in

  ```
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Content-Length: 0
  Server: CherryPy/3.8.0
  Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 22:45:17 GMT
  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
  Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
  Content-Type: application/json
  ```

- **Delete model**

  ```
  curl -i -X DELETE "http://localhost:8080/tkb/model/new_model"
  ```

  results in

  ```
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Content-Length: 0
  Server: CherryPy/3.8.0
  Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 22:45:58 GMT
  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
  Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
  Content-Type: application/json
  ```

B.7. Schemas

- GET http://localhost:8080/tkb/schemas/TREsPASS_model.xsd
- GET http://localhost:8080/tkb/schemas/TREsPASS_scenario.xsd

B.8. FileStore

- **List all files in context of model with model_id**

  ```
  curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/files/list?model_id=default_model"
  ```

  results in

  ```
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
  Server: CherryPy/6.0.1
  Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
  Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
  Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 07:52:21 GMT
  Content-Length: 632
  ```
• List all commits in context of model with model_id


results in

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Server: CherryPy/6.0.1
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 08:17:57 GMT
Content-Length: 2708
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE

[ 
  { 
"timestamp": 1468484273,
"path": "model_persistence.json",
"commit_id": "91cee7c0fab6017ad294a5172b8bf7613065cb0",
"message": "Store model_file",
"file_id": "9bed19878516872a6d3a8f03cf6960f5746431b"
  },
  ...
  { 
"timestamp": 1468484273,
"path": "type_parameters_cloud.n3",
"commit_id": "86075664e4131b183ff07fd60fc49c05773a1b65",
"message": "Add base files",
"file_id": "4da61c0878199d35173faaddc6a610814726b1c"
  }
]

• Read a file in context of model with model_id

curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/files?model_id=default_model&filename=attacker_profiles.xml"

results in

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Last-Modified: Tue, 01 Mar 2016 10:20:17 GMT
Content-Type: application/xml
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2016 15:33:38 GMT
Content-Length: 2187
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="attacker_profiles.xml"
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<profiles>
B.8. FileStore

• Read a file from git in context of model with model_id

```bash
curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/files?model_id=dummy_model&file_id=fbe9620145dedd078f0d7b48d527367df438f452"
```
results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: CherryPy/6.0.1
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 09:18:26 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="fbe9620145dedd078f0d7b48d527367df438f452"
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
Last-Modified: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 09:18:28 GMT
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 300
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
```

• Store a file in context of model with model_id

```bash
curl -i -X PUT "http://localhost:8080/tkb/files?model_id=default_model&filename=new_file.xml" \
-H "Content-Type: application/xml" -d '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><root/>
```
results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 0
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2016 15:38:35 GMT
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
```

• Store model/scenario file in context of model with model_id: currently filetype is limited to model_file|scenario_file

```bash
-H "Content-Type: application/xml" -d '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><root/>
```
results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 0
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2016 15:40:06 GMT
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
```

• Delete a file in context of model with model_id

```bash
```
results in
• Edit a file in context of model with model_id


results in a webpage to edit this file.

• Get zip of model directory with model_id (including the git information)


results in the download of the zipped model directory.

B.9. Toolchain

• Get list of toolchains


results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Length: 3011
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2016 12:34:56 GMT
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Content-Type: application/json

[
    {
        "name": "Treemaker APL ATA ATE",
        "description": "treemaker_apl_ata_ate",
        "tools": [
            {
                "publisher": "T. University of Denmark",
                "hasInput": true,
                "types": [
                    "model"
                ],
                "resources": {
                    "Input file for testing": "https://trespass.itrust.lu/data/treemaker.zip"
                },
                "name": "Treemaker",
                "description": "This tool generates an attack tree in the XML format that can be used for analyses, visualisation and for the TREsPASS process. It takes as input the description of the model in XML format.",
                "id": 15
            },
            {
                "publisher": "Cybernetica",
                "hasInput": true,
                "types": ["model"]
            }
        ]
    }
]
```
B.9. Toolchain

```
"analysis"
],
"resources": {
  "Input file for testing": "https://trespass.itrust.lu/data/apl.xml"
},
"name": "Attack Pattern Lib.",
"description": "The Attack Pattern Library (APL) is intended to promote the reuse of modular elements to improve the process of model development.
"id": 8
},
{ "publisher": "Cybernetica",
"hasInput": true,
"types": [
  "analysis"
],
"resources": {
  "Input file for testing": "https://trespass.itrust.lu/data/approxtree.txt"
},
"name": "A.T. Analyzer",
"description": "The attack tree computation tool can be used to calculate optimal attack vector (from the attacker point of view).
"id": 3
},
{ "publisher": "T. University of Denmark",
"hasInput": true,
"types": [
  "analysis"
],
"resources": {
  "Input file for testing": "https://trespass.itrust.lu/data/approxtree.txt"
},
"name": "A.T. Evaluator",
"description": "The attack tree computation tool can be used to calculate a pareto front of attack vectors.
"id": 33
}]
"id": 1
},...
```

- Start a toolchain

```
curl -i -X POST "http://localhost:8080/tkb/toolchain/1?model_id=dummy_model&attackerprofile_id=AP0007&delay=0"
```

results in

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Content-Length: 2
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2016 12:36:07 GMT
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "task_url": "http://localhost:8080/tkb/task/0d178007ae7044f6b3e5b204ce94e36"
  "task_id": "0d178007ae7044f6b3e5b204ce94e36"
}
```
B.10. Tasks

- Get list of tasks
  
  ```
  curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/task"
  ```

  results in
  
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
  Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
  Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
  Content-Length: 2
  Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2016 12:36:07 GMT
  Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
  Content-Type: application/json

  `{}`

- Get specific task
  
  ```
  curl -i "http://localhost:8080/tkb/task/0d178007ae7044fdb3de5b204ce94e36"
  ```

  results in
  
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
  Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
  Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
  Content-Length: 2
  Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2016 12:36:07 GMT
  Server: CherryPy/5.0.1
  Content-Type: application/json

  ```
  {
    "task_id": "91bf413a4edf44e8af09c2caa1bc2155",
    "status": "done",
    "end-epoch": 1458303114.895991,
    "start-epoch": 1458303112.930813,
    "end-date": "2016-03-18T13:11:54.895991+01:00",
    "tool_status": [
      {
        "status": "done",
        "end-epoch": 1458303113.999195,
        "id": 15,
        "start-epoch": 1458303112.931555,
        "result_file_url": "http://localhost:8080/tkb/files?model_id=dummy_model&filetype=treemaker_output",
        "result_filetype": "treemaker_output",
        "end-date": "2016-03-18T13:11:52.931555+01:00",
        "name": "Treemaker",
        "start-date": "2016-03-18T13:11:52.930813+01:00"
      },
      ...

  }
  ```

B.11. Modelpattern

- GET full list of model patterns in context of model with model_id (as json)

results in:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 84
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2016 17:26:41 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept

[ 
  { 
    "name": "Test Model Pattern",
    "id": "test_mp",
    "pattern": {}
  }
]

• GET specific model pattern in context of model with model_id (as json)


results in:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 70
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2016 17:27:20 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept

{ 
  "name": "Test Model Pattern",
  "id": "test_mp",
  "pattern": {}
}

• PUT: create new model pattern in context of model with model_id

curl -i -X PUT -H "Content-Type:application/json" \
    "http://localhost:8080/tkb/modelpattern/dummy_mp?model_id=default_model" \
    -d '{"name": "Test Model Pattern", "id": "dummy_mp", "pattern": {}}'

results in:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 0
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2016 17:29:01 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1

• DELETE specific model pattern in context of model with model_id

curl -i -X DELETE -H "Content-Type:application/json" \
    "http://localhost:8080/tkb/modelpattern/dummy_mp?model_id=default_model"
results in:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 0
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2016 17:29:35 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
Server: CherryPy/5.0.1